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1. Introduction 
As expressed in its 2006-2007 business plan, Transport Certification Australia Limited 
(TCA) has four organisational objectives.  Under the fourth objective, to enhance 
product and service offerings, TCA is committed to commence, jointly with the 
National Transport Commission (NTC), investigating the feasibility of on-board heavy 
vehicle (HV) mass-monitoring devices for the intelligent access programme (IAP).  
This task is simply one of many TCA will undertake on its journey to providing its 
members and the market it serves with a comprehensive set of certified parameters for 
monitoring HVs.  The set of parameters (location, time, speed, tamper-evidence, and 
proprietary trailer identification) monitored under IAP Stage 1 provides a robust 
platform on which Australia can commence providing a third level for regulating HV 
access: “intelligent access”. 
On-board mass, along with interoperability between any IAP certified prime mover 
and trailer monitoring device, expands the range of applications to which IAP can be 
applied.  This ultimately increases jurisdictional confidence in operational compliance 
and increases the negotiating power of the IAP for transport operators.   
To this end, TCA’s fourth objective provides for two projects for enhancing the 
technical capability of the IAP, viz: 
 a project to provide a standard to ensure interoperability between any IAP 
certified prime mover and trailer monitoring devices; and 
 a project to investigate the feasibility of on-board vehicle mass-monitoring 
devices for IAP use. 
These new research projects will ensure the expansion and value adding of its services 
to the transport industry and road authorities.  The projects have identified technical 
issues regarding on-board mass monitoring systems including: 
 Determination of tare vs. payload using OBM system at an evidentiary level; 
 Accuracy, robustness and tamper issues of OBM components (mass sensors, 
connections, power supply, display unit etc.); 
OBM accuracy and ancillary device testing: dynamic data analysis and tamper evidence 
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 Potential use of data to cross-check measurement results from OBM systems; 
and 
 Potential standardization of OBM components to achieve interoperability 
between trailers fitted from different suppliers. 
Accordingly, one of these projects will provide a standard to ensure interoperability 
between any IAP certified prime mover and trailer monitoring devices.  The other 
project will investigate the feasibility of on-board vehicle mass-monitoring devices for 
IAP use. 
 
1.1. Overall objective of OBM feasibility 
The objective in determining technical feasibility of on-board mass is to ascertain the 
ability to monitor HV mass to an evidentiary level.  This objective via delivery of a 
mass measure that can be utilised for a range of policy objectives including 
evidentiary-level data that can be produced and judged valid in court of law. 
The broad purpose of the feasibility assessment is to: 
a) Produce a report that identifies the state-of-the-art in on-board mass-monitoring 
technologies and the range of commercial and (quasi-) regulatory applications to 
which it is applied.  The state-of-the-art will be determined by an international 
literature review and survey of both the Australian telematics and transport 
industries. 
b) Demonstrate the feasibility of on-board vehicle mass-monitoring with 
consideration to matters of: 
• impact on, and participation of, industry and jurisdictions (usage); 
• accuracy of mass management; 
• cost; and 
• technology (across all its elements). 
OBM accuracy and ancillary device testing: dynamic data analysis and tamper evidence 
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c) In partnership with the NTC, identify, broadly, what jurisdictions will have to do 
to accommodate on-board vehicle mass monitoring as a part of an IAP system.  
This would cover: 
• changes to internal processes and systems; 
• changes to legislation/regulation1; and 
• an articulation of the positives and negatives of nationally consistent 
approaches to the above1. 
d) Identify broadly what TCA will have to do to accommodate on-board vehicle 
mass monitoring as part of an IAP system. 
This would cover: 
• changes to the IAP functional and technical specification; 
• the certification and auditing regime, and 
• the deeds of agreement. 
e) Associated with d) above, deliver a draft functional and technical specification for 
onboard mass-monitoring devices. 
The latter project would lead the way for the introduction of mass as an IAP-
monitored vehicle parameter. 
 
1.2. Aims & purpose of this report  
This report sets out draft sections to be included in the final TCA technical report on 
testing of on-board mass (OBM) systems.  It is designed to be both a stand-alone 
document and one that can be incorporated into the final TCA report on the testing 
                                                     
1 It is anticipated that these activities would be part of the NTC work 
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stage of the TCA OBM project.  The overarching TCA project (of which the report on 
both the testing stage and this report) will cover, from above: 
 tare vs. payload using OBM system for evidentiary purposes; 
 accuracy, robustness and tamper issues of OBM components. 
Other work from the testing contractor (ARRB) and TCA will be added to form a final 
technical report for the project. 
This report also forms part of the joint QUT/MR project Heavy vehicle suspensions – 
testing and analysis.  Resources from that project were released to TCA to assist in 
implementing the OBM technical feasibility project with approval from Main Roads 
on the basis that the two projects would benefit from sharing any outputs.  As such, 
the IP developed and described in general herein will form part of the final report and 
PhD thesis for the joint QUT/MR project Heavy vehicle suspensions – testing and 
analysis.  Data gathered from the OBM project will be analysed and used to inform 
both projects. 
One of the results from the TCA OBM feasibility project will be a determination of 
the accuracy and tamper-evidence of such systems.  This document addresses the 
results of that testing concerned with: 
• accuracy as determined by measuring OBM outputs vs. certified scales; and 
• tamper-evidence as garnered from changes to dynamic signals from OBM 
systems. 
The results from the testing programme will contribute to a final TCA technical report 
that will cover the following issues in four key areas: 
Accuracy and robustness: 
The test programme will develop and assess accuracy of various OBM systems on a 
range of rigid vehicles and combinations, with various suspension types in a range of 
operating environments across jurisdictions. 
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Additional data: 
The test programme will investigate the potential use of additional data from the 
electronic braking systems, engine control modules or other dynamic OBM data as 
validation against data from the static data recorded by these OBM systems. 
Human machine interface: 
The test programme will develop agreed best practice guidelines and procedures for 
installation, calibration, operation and maintenance including consideration of tare 
mass. 
Tamper evidence: 
The test programme will identify the main areas of potential tamper and development 
of both technical and business options to work-around these tamper points. 
These four key areas for investigation are shown diagrammatically in Figure 1.  The 
task of field testing is the key sub-project that will assesses the technical feasibility of 
on-board vehicle mass monitoring. 
Queensland has operated IAP-like on-board mass-monitoring trials for several years, 
and has recently built on this work by undertaking testing on the accuracy and tamper 
vulnerability of particular on-board mass-monitoring system(s) being used (Davis, 
2006b). 
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Figure 1.  Overall OBM feasibility project task/activity interrelations (Karl, 2007). 
 
1.3. Organisation of this report 
The testing involved determining the performance of HV OBM systems as mentioned 
above: 
• accuracy as determined by measuring OBM outputs vs. certified scales; and 
• tamper-evidence as garnered from changes to dynamic signals from OBM 
systems.  Originally, this data was also to come from electronic braking 
systems and engine control modules but this will be addressed differently and 
later in the programme. 
The divisions in this report are designed to lead the reader through the following steps 
of the testing of OBM for accuracy and to inform tamper-evidence as part of the larger 
project.  Accordingly, the sections associated with the realisation of those aims and 
objectives are listed in summary here with an indication of the section content to 
which the reader is directed for detailed commentary on each: 
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“Introduction” and “Background” provide the needs that have resulted in the push 
for OBM testing and the rationale that has led to the current state of events: viz, now 
that OBM feasibility is being investigated.  “Background” also outlines the activities 
such as the literature review undertaken by ARRB and the tasks required under the 
overall OBM feasibility programme. 
“Commentary on the static data plots” provides detail to be included in the final 
TCA report by way of introductory comments that assist to guide the reader needing a 
refresher on statistical interpretation of linear x-y plots.  Other analysis will 
undoubtedly be included in the final TCA report.  This may include ANOVA2 and 
other, more sophisticated, statistical techniques.  The level of sophistication of any 
statistical analysis will be at the discretion of TCA. 
“Recording and analysis of dynamic data” outlines briefly the experimental 
procedures used for recording the dynamic data as executed in the test plan (Davis, 
Bunker, & Karl, 2008a, 2008b; Karl, 2007).  This section includes a brief explanation 
of the dynamic recording equipment and how it was used. 
“Dynamic data results” shows the outcomes of the analysis of the dynamic data.  
This section provides dynamic data analysis of the dynamic data recorded under the 
test programme.  This includes frequency-domain plots of the dynamic data and the 
results of analysis of dynamic data using a proposed tampering indication metric, 
developed as a result of this project. 
The final content of this report, aside from the Appendices, is “Discussion” which 
proposed some methodologies for tamper-detection under the longer-term OBM 
project implementation. 
                                                     
2 ANalysis Of VAriation between groups 
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2. Background 
2.1. General 
Road authorities and transport regulators are under continuous pressure from the 
transport industry to allow “freight efficient” vehicles onto the road network.  Outputs 
from the final report of the DIVINE project (OECD, 1998) were used in Australia to 
support the argument that air-sprung HVs should carry greater mass under the micro-
economic reform popular in the 1980s and 1990s in Australia.  One of these reforms 
was the mass limits review (MLR) project as implemented under the second heavy 
vehicle reform package (National Transport Commission, 2003).  This was concluded 
that HVs would be allowed to operate at HML loadings if: 
• certain vehicle design standards were met; and 
• HVs at HML loadings kept to specified routes (viz: the “HML network” in 
each State). 
This resulted in the implementation of HML schemes in various guises in all 
Australian States.  Details vary between Australian States in terms of HML access and 
conditions but, in terms of additional mass, HML generally allows increases above 
statutory mass of ∆2.5t on a HV tri-axle group and ∆0.5t on a HV tandem axle group. 
The implementation of the various HML schemes in Australia has not stopped the 
road transport industry pressuring road authorities and transport regulators for more 
concessions on mass and vehicle combinations, however.  The road transport 
industry’s response to continued pressure from their clients for ever-increasing 
efficiency generally involves proposing HVs towing more trailers with: 
• a greater number of axles or axle groups; 
• more gross vehicle mass (GVM); 
• greater axle loadings; and/or 
OBM accuracy and ancillary device testing: dynamic data analysis and tamper evidence 
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• greater axle group loadings. 
Fewer prime movers and drivers for a given freight task make these scenarios more 
attractive financially to transport operators and their clients.  Accordingly, increasing 
numbers of HVs with more trailers, greater axle masses and axle group masses have 
been rolled out in response to such pressures.  The first serious post-HML wave of 
these types of HVs is now operational although these vehicles have been on the 
network in various forms since the 1980s (Haldane, 2002) under the generic term 
“multi-combination vehicles” or MCVs. 
In an effort to manage these non-standard HVs (including those operating at HML) 
and keep them to their permitted routes, regulators and road authorities developed the 
Intelligent Access Project in the late 1990’s.  This project has now borne fruit in the 
form of a regulatory body, Transport Certification Australia and implementation of the 
Intelligent Access Programme. 
The first tranche of vehicles considered for Intelligent Access Programme monitoring 
in NSW and Queensland were HML vehicles.  Indeed, the agreement between two 
Australian States and the Commonwealth (Australia Department of Transport and 
Regional Services, 2005a, 2005b) specified that greater network access for HML 
vehicles was contingent on their being tracked using GPS technology via the IAP.  Up 
until that point, the IAP managers had considered implementation of on-board mass 
monitoring as a Stage 2 activity within the IAP implementation framework.  This was 
due to the complexity of OBM coupled with an already intricate and exhaustive Stage 
1 programme negotiated with six Australian States, 2 Australian Territories and set up 
to monitor location, timing, speed and configuration of HVs. 
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2.2. The need for OBM monitoring 
In light of the growing freight task, asset protection has become an increasingly 
important issue for transport jurisdictions and regulators.  With the demand for 
higher productivity vehicles driving national agendas such as performance-based 
standards (PBS), TCA has embarked on a programme of improving the number and 
value of its services.  One of these expansions may be OBM.  To this end, this test 
programme will inform the feasibility of OBM systems with a view to adding that 
feature to the IAP.  Accordingly, this test programme will result in broad potential 
benefits and applicability to TCA stakeholders as outlined in Section 2.4. 
 
2.3. The need for OBM testing 
All Australian States have a Bilateral Infrastructure Funding Agreement (BIFA) with 
the Australian Government.  These are also known as the “AusLink agreements”.  
Each BIFA is an agreement between individual States of Australia and the 
Commonwealth, which covers arrangements applying to “funding made available by 
the Australian Government to [all Australian States] under the first five-year AusLink 
investment programme (2004-05 to 2008-09) and any agreed subsequent changes to, 
and extensions of, the programme.  It also covers agreed arrangements for 
infrastructure planning, identification of investment priorities, development and 
assessment of project proposals and evaluation of completed projects” (Australia 
Department of Transport and Regional Services, 2005b). 
An alteration to the focus of TCA occurred with respect to OBM (see Background).  
This was triggered by NSW’s and Queensland’s BIFA (Australia Department of 
Transport and Regional Services, 2005a, 2005b) obligations in that HML vehicles be 
monitored by the IAP. 
Specifically Queensland’s BIFA states (authors’ bolding for emphasis): 
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“74) Accordingly, both parties agree to work co-operatively towards ensuring a 
structured sensible extension of HML vehicle access onto a broader strategic network.  
It is agreed that further extensions will reflect the following principles: 
a) Both parties commit to accelerating the development of the Intelligent Access 
Program (IAP).  Specifically, both parties: 
i. support vehicle tracking with suitable mass compliance functionality 
being implemented for all HML vehicles on a national basis, and 
eventually to other restricted access heavy vehicle categories; and 
ii. agree that access to HML will be conditional on an enforceable 
commitment from all operators to participate in the full IAP process 
from the time that it is operational and available. 
The Australian Government will provide funding to: 
• the National Transport Commission (NTC) and/or Transport Certification 
Australian Limited, as appropriate, to accelerate this process with a view to 
ensuring that both route access and mass compliance can be accurately 
monitored and regulatory breaches enforced…..” 
NSW’s BIFA contains the following provisions: 
“66) Access conditions for HML-eligible vehicles operating on the NSW network 
shall be as follows: 
…c) vehicles shall be enrolled in a route-compliance monitoring regime using the 
Intelligent Access Program (IAP), from the time that it is operational and 
available…” 
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2.4. IAP Stage 2 
At its August 2005 meeting, the TCA Board of Directors considered and endorsed 
Version 1 of the 2005/06 business plan.  At that meeting, the Board of Directors 
agreed to move to Stage 2 of IAP.  The move was triggered by the NSW and 
Queensland obligations under their respective BIFAs to use IAP as a condition to the 
expansion of their HML network (Australia Department of Transport and Regional 
Services, 2005a, 2005b).  The Board also requested that a revised business plan be 
developed to address this move to Stage 2.  This decision introduced a new 
complexity to the IAP domain. 
As mentioned above, Stage 1 of IAP was designed to manage the location, timing, 
speed and configuration of a HV.  The large-scale application of IAP to HML vehicles 
requires the management of vehicle mass.  However, it was acknowledged that the 
ideal way to manage mass is via on-board mass monitoring technology; in setting up 
IAP Stage 1, the TCA Board realised that solution was potentially several years away.  
To manage the mass aspects of expanded HML access in the meantime, the Board 
endorsed an interim self-declaration function allowing transport operators to identify 
when they were operating at HML.  This is supported currently by a slightly revised 
National Heavy Vehicle Accreditation Scheme (NHVAS). 
The TCA’s 2006/07 business plan was endorsed by the TCA board at its meeting in 
July 2006.  That business plan included two projects for enhancing the technical 
capability of the IAP: 
• a project to provide a standard to ensure interoperability between any IAP 
certified prime mover and trailer monitoring devices; and 
• a project to investigate the feasibility of on-board vehicle mass-monitoring 
devices for IAP use. 
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3. Commentary on the static data plots 
3.1. General 
The final TCA report will contain x-y plots of data from the weighbridge plotted on 
the x-axis as the reference mass or RM (Davis et al., 2008b) against the data or 
measured mass (MM) from the OBM system under test on the y-axis.   
This section informs that process as a statistical theory refresher to readers.  Statistical 
analysis other than that shown below may be included in the final TCA report. 
Notes and conventions: 
 the standard deviation (σ ) is the standard deviation of the population 
data; 
 large values of σ result in a wide spread of data between the tails of the 
distribution of data present due to random variation in any system or 
measurement process (Figure 2); 
 σ is proportional to the propensity of the data to cluster around the 
mean of the data; and 
 higher σ values indicate a greater diffusion of data points away from 
the mean value of the data and hence reduced precision (i.e. a wider 
spread of data as shown in Figure 2). 
The x-y plots show regression lines (Dubes, 1968; Hamburg, 1983; Harder, 2005; 
Hoel & Jessen, 1971; Layfield, 2003; Werner, 2002) which have a formula and a R2 
value associated with them.  These regression lines are lines of best fit which provide 
(in the case of this report) some important quality indicators for how well the 
measured values from the on-board mass (OBM) systems correlated to the actual mass 
of the test vehicles as measured by the weighbridge(s).  Other quality indicators are 
the standard deviations (σ) of the data. 
The formulae are in the in the form: 
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 y = mx + c 
Equation 1 
 
The quality indicators of the data are in the x-y plots’ regression formulae and the R2 
values associated with them.  These quality indicators can be examined in more detail 
as follows: 
From the above formula: 
 y is the data plotted on the y-axis and is the OBM reading as measured; 
 c is the y-axis intercept of the best-fit line.  Ideally, for these tests, this 
value should be zero, which would mean that the relationship between 
the weighbridge value and the OBM reading would have a common 
point of origin where the x-axis and the y-axis meet.  Any variation 
away from zero indicates an OBM offset (error or inaccuracy) and/or a 
skewed slope (see below) in the relationship between the OBM reading 
and the actual mass as measured by the weighbridge.  This results from 
differences between the mean of the readings and the weighbridge 
reading.  This difference may be visualised as the disparity between the 
actual value and the mean of the measured data in Figure 2 (Davis et 
al., 2008b); 
 the value m in the formula above indicates the slope of the regression 
line on the x-y plots.  Ideally, this should be 1.0.  A value of m of 1.0 
would give the regression line a 45o angle and show perfect alignment 
between the OBM values and the weighbridge.  In general, the 
coefficient of x in the regression line expresses variation (not variance) 
as a change in OBM reading per change in the weighbridge reading 
(Hamburg, 1983).  The percentage difference between the value of m 
and 1.0 can be said to be twice the inaccuracy of the regression 
between the weighbridge and the OBM reading, e.g. for a value of m = 
1.1, the inaccuracy could be said to be +/- 5%.  Similar to divergent 
values of c away from zero, any variation in m away from 1.0 indicates 
an OBM error or inaccuracy due to a skewed slope in the relationship 
OBM accuracy and ancillary device testing: dynamic data analysis and tamper evidence 
 
 
22 
 
between the OBM reading and the actual mass as measured by the 
weighbridge.  This will result in differences between the mean of the 
readings and the weighbridge reading.  This difference may be 
visualised as the disparity between the actual value and the mean of the 
measured data in Figure 2; and 
 R2 is a quality indicator of the regression process.  R2, expressed as a 
percentage, is the variance (not the variation) in the OBM data which is 
ascribable to the variation in the weighbridge readings (Hamburg, 
1983).  Another way to think of this value is how well (as a percentage) 
the data fit is correlated linearly as a percentage (Layfield, 2003). 
Recapping for the x-y plots, for ideal situations and perfect alignment of the OBM 
systems with the weighbridge, theoretically: 
 any regression line plotted should pass through zero (zero y-intercept 
value in the line-of-best-fit equation);  
 have an R2 value of 1.0; and 
 have a slope (coefficient of x in the equation) of 1.0 (i.e. have an angle 
of 45o). 
 
Figure 2.  Visual interpretation of accuracy, precision and tails used to derive critical values for degrees of 
confidence. 
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4. Recording and analysis of dynamic data 
4.1. Overview 
Testing was carried out as per the test plan (Davis et al., 2008a, 2008b; Karl, 2007).  
Arising from that programme, dynamic data were recorded during dynamic activity 
(test vehicle moving) of the HVs and whilst the HVs were stationary (stationary data).  
These data were measured using a dynamic measurement system.  This dynamic 
measurement system was an OBM system that could measure data from the OBM 
transducers mounted on the HV's suspension.  Its recording rate was 41.6 Hz or at 
intervals of 24 ms. 
 
4.2. Data recording and vehicle status 
4.2.1. General 
Signals from the primary transducers (usually the APTs) were recorded by a 
customised OBM system owned by Main Roads Qld denoted the “reference system”.  
This system was installed on every vehicle tested.  Tests were performed where data 
were recorded at 24 ms intervals for a period of 30 s with the test vehicle stationary or 
moving around its test circuit.  Accordingly, the data recorded were dynamic in the 
strict sense, even though the test vehicle was sometimes stationary.  The distinction is 
able to be made in Table 2 in the test descriptions.  Matlab® fast Fourier transform 
(FFT) analysis was performed on the dynamic signals recorded from the reference 
system when the test vehicle was both stationary and moving. 
 
4.2.2. Tampering 
The primary transducers proffered by the OBM manufacturers for the test programme 
were largely air pressure transducers (APTs).  These were used to measure a signal 
proportional to the mass on the particular wheel or axle group of the vehicle under 
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test.  For the tamper events, the inputs to the APTs on the test HVs were tampered 
with by opening or shutting off ball valves interposed between the air line to the air 
springs and the APTs (Davis et al., 2008a).  The resultant lack of pneumatic 
connection between the pressure in the air springs and the measurement of that 
pressure resulted in a loss of dynamic data for the tests denoted as "tampering".  The 
intention was to determine if there were differences in the dynamic signals from the 
APTs should the air lines be blocked as an attempt to tamper with the reading to the 
OBM unit. 
 
5. Dynamic data results 
5.1. Background 
The following section details the outputs of the analysis of the dynamic data from the 
programme.  In some places, it shows representative or indicative results taken from 
typical samples of the dynamic data.  This due to the similarity of the results enabling 
a generic display of the outputs.  In other places, a complete data set has been 
presented. 
5.2. Conventions and explanation of some terms 
5.2.1. Fast Fourier Transform plots 
Matlab® fast Fourier transform (FFT) graphs have been used for illustrative purposesc.  
Examples of these are shown in Figure 3 and Figure 4. 
The FFT function of Matlab® was used to produce these frequency-series plots.  
Logarithmic x-axes scales have been specified.  These produced an x-axis format more 
conducive to displaying frequency data extending over many decades as shown in 
Figure 4.  The alternative to this was linearly-scaled frequency axes that produced a 
compressed view of the relevant data at the extreme left of the plot as shown in Figure 
3. 
                                                     
c
 MATLAB is a product of The MathWorks, Inc. 
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Figure 3.  Example of FFT with linear x-axis as frequency series. 
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Figure 4.  Example of FFT with logarithmic x-axis as frequency series. 
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For the frequency series on the x-axis of the FFT plots, the conventions in Table 1 will 
be used in the following section. 
 
Scientific notation (power of 10) 
 
Conventional notation (decimal) 
10-1 Hz 
 
0.1 Hz 
 
100 Hz 
 
1.0 Hz 
 
101 Hz 
 
10 Hz 
 
Table 1.  Relating scientific notation of FFT plots to conventional decimal notation. 
 
5.3. Frequency analysis results 
5.3.1. General 
Table 2 provides the frequency analysis results for the HVs tested.  This for the two 
test cases of tampering with the air lines to the APTs, i.e. a summary of the FFT 
analysis of the dynamic data recorded: 
 with the ball valves to the APTs open (normal operation); and 
 with the ball valves to the APTs shut (denoted “tamper test” in Table 2), 
when the particular HV under test was moving around its test circuit. 
The loadings at 1/3 and 2/3 capacity were not exact with respect to the full load 
capacity.  They were approximations so that operation and measurements at 4 load 
points could be gathered over the operational weight range of the HV. 
Where frequencies such as 0.1 Hz or 1.0 Hz, etc are listed in the table, references to 
Figures later in the report are made in the first few instances.  This is to provide 
illustrative examples of typical frequency series that were the output from the analysis.   
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Figure 7 shows an example for the fundamental frequency present of 0.15 Hz.  Note 
also in this Figure, however, multiple peaks at 0.6Hz, 1.05 Hz, 1.10 Hz and 1.15 Hz 
were present, even though they were not as large as the fundamental at 0.15 Hz.  
Figure 8 shows multiple peaks at 0.55Hz, 1.0 Hz, 1.05 Hz and 1.10 Hz that were 
present in the FFT plot.  Figure 9 illustrates where the peak frequency was 0.2 Hz but 
with multiple frequency peaks present at 0.7Hz and 1.02 Hz.  The FFT in Figure 10 
peaked at 1.0 Hz with multiple peaks at 0.6Hz, 1.0 Hz, 1.06 Hz and 1.15 Hz.  In 
Figure 11, the peak frequency shown is approximately 2.2 Hz and multiple peaks may 
be seen at 0.6Hz, 1.0 Hz, 1.05 Hz and 1.12 Hz.  Figure 12 shows a FFT plot resulting 
in dynamic data presenting both a peak in the dynamic signal at approximately 0.1 
(10-1) Hz as well as other peaks at 0.7Hz, 0.9 Hz and 1.0 Hz.  In Figure 13, the peak at 
1.0 Hz may be seen distinctly separated from multiple peak magnitudes of frequency 
at approximately 0.6 Hz and 1.13 Hz. 
Note: sometimes there were two or three peak frequencies, particularly for the data 
recorded during test HV travel on its test circuit, without the occurrence of tampering.  
Where this occurred, the frequency corresponding to the greatest magnitude has been 
reported. 
Where the same or similar values of frequency are listed later in Table 2, the result 
from that particular test analysis was not different enough from the other instances to 
warrant providing a separate FFT plot.  Similarly, frequency values are for the RHS 
air springs unless otherwise noted.  There were not sufficient differences in the LHS 
vs. RHS frequency values to require separate listings. 
Note that in Table 1, the load points relate to the GVM for the combination tested. 
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Table 2.  Frequency spectrum results - peak magnitude and corresponding frequency for the vehicles tested. 
ELA007 Rigid (1.1) no tampering Stationary - - Fully 
Laden 
17830 No peak 
(Figure 
5) 
- - - 
ELA008 Rigid (1.1) no tampering Moving 20 Speed bump Fully 
Laden 
17830 1.5 - - - 
ELA009 Rigid (1.1) With chocks/wedges 
under load cells/ball 
valves in 'off' position 
Stationary - - Fully 
Laden 
17830 0.1 
(Figure 
6) 
- - - 
ELA010 Rigid (1.1) With chocks/wedges 
under load cells/ball 
valves in 'off' position 
Moving 20 Speed bump Fully 
Laden 
17830 0.1 
(Figure 
6) 
- - - 
ELA011 Rigid (1.1) With ride height 
control valves 
modified 
Stationary - - Fully 
Laden 
17830 0.1 
(Figure 
6) 
- - - 
ELA012 Rigid (1.1) With ride height 
control valves 
modified 
Moving 20 Speed bump Fully 
Laden 
17830 1.6 
(Figure 
13) 
- - - 
ELA013 Rigid (1.1) With fuel tank near 
empty 
Stationary - - Fully 
Laden 
17830 0.1 
(Figure 
6) 
- - - 
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ELA014 Rigid (1.1) With fuel tank near 
empty 
Moving 20 Speed bump Fully 
Laden 
17830 1.5 
(Figure 
13) 
- - - 
ELA016 Rigid (1.1) Testing Stationary 20 - Fully 
Laden 
17830 No peak 
(Figure 
5) 
- - - 
ELA017 Rigid (1.1) Testing Moving - Speed bump Fully 
Laden 
17830 1.4 - - - 
ELA028 Rigid (1.1) @ 10 km/h Moving 10 Speed bump Fully 
Laden 
17830 1.3 - - - 
ELA029 Rigid (1.1) @ 10 km/h Moving 10 Speed bump Fully 
Laden 
17830 1.3 - - - 
ELA030 Rigid (1.1) Moving Stationary 20 - Fully 
Laden 
15820 No peak 
(Figure 
5) 
- - - 
ELA031 Rigid (1.1) Moving Moving - Speed bump 2/3 
Laden 
15820 1.6 - - - 
ELA043 Rigid (1.1) Moving Stationary 20 - 2/3 
Laden 
13780 No peak 
(Figure 
5) 
- - - 
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ELA044 Rigid (1.1) Moving Moving - Speed bump 1/3 
Laden 
13780 1.6 - - - 
ELA055 Rigid (1.1) Moving Stationary 20 - 1/3 
Laden 
11760 No peak - - - 
ELA056 Rigid (1.1) Moving Moving - Speed bump Tare 11760 2.0 - - - 
ACA015 Double road 
train 
(1.2s2_2s2) 
baseline Stationary 0 - Full 83000 No peak 
(Figure 
5) 
No peak 
(Figure 
5) 
No peak 
(Figure 
5) 
No peak 
(Figure 
5) 
ACA016 Double road 
train 
(1.2s2_2s2) 
Tamper - Ball valves Stationary 0 - Full 83000 No peak 
(Figure 
5) 
No peak 
(Figure 
5) 
No peak 
(Figure 
5) 
0.1 
(Figure 
6) 
ACA017 Double road 
train 
(1.2s2_2s2) 
Tamper - Ball valves Stationary 0 - Full 83000 No peak No peak No peak 0.1 
(Figure 
6) 
ACA022 Double road 
train 
(1.2s2_2s2) 
Static Run 1 Stationary 0 - Full 83000 No peak No peak No peak No peak 
ACA023 Double road 
train 
(1.2s2_2s2) 
Dynamic Run 1 Moving 18 Speed bump Full 83000 0.3 
(Figure 
7) 
0.4 
(Figure 
7) 
0.6 
(Figure 
7) 
0.6 
(Figure 
7) 
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ACA030 Double road 
train 
(1.2s2_2s2) 
Extra dynamic Run 1 Moving 15 Continuous 
inputs 
Full 83000 1.1 
(Figure 
8) 
0.9 
(Figure 
8) 
1.05 
(Figure 
8) 
1.0 
(Figure 
8) 
ACA036 Double road 
train 
(1.2s2_2s2) 
Static Run 1 Moving 0 - 2/3 
Laden 
67500 No peak No peak No peak No peak 
ACA037 Double road 
train 
(1.2s2_2s2) 
Dynamic Run 1 Moving 18 Speed bump 2/3 
Laden 
67500 0.15 
(Figure 
7) 
0.3 
(Figure 
7) 
0.3 
(Figure 
7) 
0.3 
(Figure 
7) 
ACA044 Double road 
train 
(1.2s2_2s2) 
Extra dynamic Run 1 Moving 15 Continuous 
inputs 
2/3 
Laden 
67500 1.0 
(Figure 
8) 
1.0 
(Figure 
8) 
2.2  
(Figure 
11) 
1.0 
(Figure 
8) 
ACA050 Double road 
train 
(1.2s2_2s2) 
Static Run 1 Stationary 0 - 1/3 
Laden 
51100 No peak No peak No peak No peak 
ACA051 Double road 
train 
(1.2s2_2s2) 
Dynamic Run 1 Moving 18 Speed bump 1/3 
Laden 
51100 0.7 
(Figure 
12) 
0.3 0.3 0.4 
ACA060 Double road 
train 
(1.2s2_2s2) 
Extra dynamic Run 1 Moving 15 Continuous 
inputs 
1/3 
Laden 
51100 2.0 1.0 
(similar to 
Figure 
10) 
1.0 1.0 
ACA064 Double road 
train 
Static Run 1 Stationary 0 - Tare 30200 No peak No peak No peak No peak 
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(1.2s2_2s2) 
ACA065 Double road 
train 
(1.2s2_2s2) 
Dynamic Run 1 Moving 18 Speed bump Tare 30200 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.2 
 
ACA070 Double road 
train 
(1.2s2_2s2) 
Extra dynamic Run 1 Moving 15 Continuous 
inputs 
Tare 30200 1.0 
(Figure 
13) 
1.0 
(Figure 
13) 
1.0 
(Figure 
13) 
1.0 
(Figure 
13) 
TRA010 Truck&Dog 
(1.2_2s2) 
Tamper - Ball valves Stationary 0 - Full 48200 0.1 - No peak 0.1 
TRA012 Truck&Dog 
(1.2_2s2) 
Run 1 Stationary 0 - Full 48200 No peak - No peak No peak 
TRA013 Truck&Dog 
(1.2_2s2) 
Run 2 Stationary 0 - Full 48200 No peak - No peak No peak 
TRA014 Truck&Dog 
(1.2_2s2) 
Dynamic Run 1 Moving 25 Roundabout 
- sealed road 
Full 48200 1.0 - 0.5 0.5 
TRA015 Truck&Dog 
(1.2_2s2) 
Dynamic Run 2 Moving 10 U-turn, 
unsealed 
road 
Full 48200 1.1 - 1.1 0.6 
PSB006 Jinker (1.2s3) Dynamic run 1 Moving 10 - Full 43000 1.1 1.1 - - 
PSB007 Jinker (1.2s3) Dynamic run 2 Moving 10 - Full 43000 1.1 1.1 - - 
PSB013 Jinker (1.2s3) Tamper - ball valves & 
wedges 
Stationary 0 - Full 43000 0.1 0.1 - - 
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PSB015 Jinker (1.2s3) Run 1 Stationary 0 - Full 43000 No peak 0.1 - - 
PSA004 B-double 
(1.2s3s3) 
Dynamic run 1 Moving 10 LHS B trailer 
APT signals 
failedd 
Full 67500 1.1 0.5 0.2  
PSA005 B-double 
(1.2s3s3) 
Dynamic run 2 Moving 10 LHS B trailer 
APT signals 
failed 
Full 67500 1.1 1.1 1.1 - 
PSA012 B-double 
(1.2s3s3) 
Tamper - ball valves & 
wedges 
Stationary 0 LHS B trailer 
APT signals 
failed 
Full 67500 0.1 0.1 0.1 - 
PSA015 B-double 
(1.2s3s3) 
Run 1 Stationary 0 LHS B trailer 
APT signals 
failed 
Full 67500 No peak No peak No peak - 
LMA008 Truck&Dog 
(1.2_1s2) 
Tamper test - ball 
valves in off position 
Stationary 0 LHS dog 
dolly APT 
signals failede 
Full 47600 0.1 
(Figure 
6) 
- No peak 0.1 
(Figure 
6) 
LMA011 Truck&Dog 
(1.2_1s2) 
Run 1 Stationary 0 LHS dog 
dolly APT 
signals failed 
Full 47600 0.1 
(Figure 
6) 
- No peak 0.1 
(Figure 
6) 
                                                     
d
 Frequency values for the RHS of the B-Double B trailer are shown here 
e
 Frequency values for the RHS of the dog dolly are shown here 
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LMA012 Truck&Dog 
(1.2_1s2) 
Dynamic Run  1 Moving over 
speed bump 
10 LHS dog 
dolly APT 
signals failed 
Full 47600 0.7 - 0.2 0.3 
LMA024 Truck&Dog 
(1.2_1s2) 
Run 1 Stationary 0 LHS dog 
dolly APT 
signals failed 
2/3 
Laden 
38900 No peak - No peak No peak 
LMA025 Truck&Dog 
(1.2_1s2) 
Dynamic Run  1 Moving over 
speed bump 
10 LHS dog 
dolly APT 
signals failed 
2/3 
Laden 
38900 0.4 - 0.4 0.4 
LMA035 Truck&Dog 
(1.2_1s2) 
Run 1 Stationary 0 LHS dog 
dolly APT 
signals failed 
1/3 
Laden 
27800 No peak - No peak No peak 
LMA036 Truck&Dog 
(1.2_1s2) 
Dynamic Run 1 Moving over 
speed bump 
10 LHS dog 
dolly APT 
signals failed 
1/3 
Laden 
27800 0.4 - 0.2 0.3 
LMA047 Truck&Dog 
(1.2_1s2) 
Run 1 Stationary 0 LHS dog 
dolly APT 
signals failed 
Empty 15900 No peak - No peak No peak 
LMA048 Truck&Dog 
(1.2_1s2) 
Dynamic Run 1 Moving over 
speed bump 
10 LHS dog 
dolly APT 
signals failed 
Empty 15900 0.8 - 0.8 0.5 
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LMB074 
Semi-trailer 
(1.2s3) 
Tamper test – ball 
valves in off position Stationary 0 - 
Full 
43100 
0.1 
(Figure 
6) 
0.1 
(Figure 
6) 
- - 
LMB076 
Semi-trailer 
(1.2s3) Run 1 Stationary 0 - 
Full 
43100 
No peak No peak - - 
LMB077 
Semi-trailer 
(1.2s3) Run 1 Moving 10 speed bump 
Full 
43100 
0.4 0.5 - - 
LMB088 
Semi-trailer 
(1.2s3) Run 1 Stationary 0 - 
2/3 
Laden 30000 
No peak No peak - - 
LMB089 
Semi-trailer 
(1.2s3) Run 1 Moving 10 speed bump 
2/3 
Laden 30000 
0.2 0.3 - - 
LMB101 
Semi-trailer 
(1.2s3) Run 1 Stationary 0 - 
1/3 
Laden 26450 
No peak No peak - - 
LMB102 
Semi-trailer 
(1.2s3) Run 1 Moving 10 speed bump 
1/3 
Laden 26450 
0.2 0.5 - - 
LMB113 
Semi-trailer 
(1.2s3) Run 1 Stationary 0 - 
Empty 
15000 
No peak No peak - - 
LMB114 
Semi-trailer 
(1.2s3) Run 1 Moving 10 speed bump 
Empty 
15000 
0.2 0.6 - - 
50 Semi-trailer 
(1.2s3) 
Corner 1 Moving - - Tare 11280 0.8 1.0 - - 
51 Semi-trailer 
(1.2s3) 
Speed Bump Moving - - Tare 11280 0.2 0.3 - - 
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52 Semi-trailer 
(1.2s3) 
Corner 2 Moving - - Tare 11280 0.7 0.2 - - 
55 Semi-trailer 
(1.2s3) 
Tamper test – ball 
valves in off position 
Moving - - Tare 11280 No peak 0.1 - - 
40 Semi-trailer 
(1.2s3) 
Corner 1 Moving - Prime mover 
APT signals 
failed 
1/3 
Laden 
15644 No peak 
 
0.4 - - 
41 Semi-trailer 
(1.2s3) 
Speed Bump Moving - Prime mover 
APT signals 
failed 
1/3 
Laden 
15644 No peak 0.2 - - 
45 Semi-trailer 
(1.2s3) 
Tamper test – ball 
valves in off position 
Moving - Prime mover 
APT signals 
failed 
1/3 
Laden 
15644 No peak 0.1 - - 
31 Semi-trailer 
(1.2s3) 
Corner 1 Moving - Prime mover 
APT signals 
failed 
2/3 
Laden 
16800 No peak 0.4 - - 
32 Semi-trailer 
(1.2s3) 
Corner 2 Moving - Prime mover 
APT signals 
failed 
2/3 
Laden 
16800 No peak 0.3 - - 
36 Semi-trailer 
(1.2s3) 
Tamper test – ball 
valves in off position 
Moving - Prime mover 
APT signals 
failed 
2/3 
Laden 
16800 No peak 0.1 - - 
13 Semi-trailer 
(1.2s3) 
Corner 1 Moving - - Full 26380 0.8 1.0 - - 
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  Peak Frequency (Hz) 
Test 
ID# 
Vehicle Test description 
Stationary 
/Moving 
Approx. 
Speed 
(km/h) 
Test Notes 
Loading Static 
GVM (kg) 
Drive 
axle/s 
Trailer or 
A trailer 
Dog dolly 
or B trailer 
Dog rear 
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14 Semi-trailer 
(1.2s3) 
Corner 2 Moving - - Full 26380 0.2 1.0 - - 
25 Semi-trailer 
(1.2s3) 
Tamper test – ball 
valves in off position 
Moving - - Full 26380 No peak 0.1 - - 
72 B-double 
(1.2s3s3) 
Run 4 Moving - - Tare 22940 0.15 0.3 0.2  
83 B-double 
(1.2s3s3) 
Run 5 Moving - - Tare 22940 0.2 0.3 0.2  
98 B-double 
(1.2s3s3) 
Run 6 Moving - - Tare 22940 0.2 0.3 0.5  
242 B-double 
(1.2s3s3) 
Run 4 Moving - - 1/3 
Laden 
38980 0.2 0.2 0.6  
245 B-double 
(1.2s3s3) 
Run 5 Moving - - 1/3 
Laden 
38980 0.2 0.2 0.4  
248 B-double 
(1.2s3s3) 
Run 6 Moving - - 1/3 
Laden 
38980 0.2 0.2 0.2  
174 B-double 
(1.2s3s3) 
Run 4 Moving - - 2/3 
Laden 
52600 0.2 1.0 0.2  
177 B-double 
(1.2s3s3) 
Run 5 Moving - - 2/3 
Laden 
52600 0.2 1.0 0.2  
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  Peak Frequency (Hz) 
Test 
ID# 
Vehicle Test description 
Stationary 
/Moving 
Approx. 
Speed 
(km/h) 
Test Notes 
Loading Static 
GVM (kg) 
Drive 
axle/s 
Trailer or 
A trailer 
Dog dolly 
or B trailer 
Dog rear 
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180 B-double 
(1.2s3s3) 
Run 6 Moving - - 2/3 
Laden 
52600 0.2 1.0 0.3  
17 B-double 
(1.2s3s3) 
Run 4 Moving - - Full 60140 0.2 0.2 0.2  
19 B-double 
(1.2s3s3) 
Run 5 Moving - - Full 60140 0.3 0.3 0.2  
22 B-double 
(1.2s3s3) 
Run 6 Moving - - Full 60140 0.5 0.2 0.2  
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5.3.2. FFT plots 
Noting, in reiteration, that sometimes there were two or three peak frequencies, 
particularly for the dynamic testing without tampering; for example Fig 9.  Where this 
occurred, the frequency corresponding to the greatest magnitude has been reported in 
Table 2. 
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Figure 5.  Example of FFT when no peaks were present in the dynamic signal. 
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Figure 6.  Example of FFT when the peak in the dynamic signal was at or below 0.1 (10-1) Hz. 
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Figure 7.  Example of FFT when the peak in the dynamic signal was above 0.1 (10-1) Hz.   
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Figure 8.  Example of FFT when the peak in the dynamic signal was approximately 1.0 (100) Hz.   
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Figure 9.  Example of FFT when the peak in the dynamic signal was above 0.1 (10-1) Hz.  
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Figure 10.  Example of FFT when the peak in the dynamic signal was above 0.1 (10-1) Hz.   
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Figure 11.  Example of FFT when the peak in the dynamic signal was above 0.1 (10-1) Hz.   
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Figure 12.  Example of FFT when the dynamic data presented both a peak in the dynamic signal at 
approximately 0.1 (10-1) Hz as well as other peaks at 0.7Hz, 0.9 Hz and 1.0 Hz. 
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Figure 13.  Example of FFT when the peak in the dynamic signal was approximately 1.0 (100) Hz.   
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5.4. Tampering Indicator 
5.4.1. General 
 
To determine whether tampering has occurred, a measure denoted the tampering 
indicator (TI) has been developed.  The tampering indicator (TI) value is a non-
dimensional number. 
It is proposed as one of the quality indicators of OBM data regarding notification of a 
potential tamper event.  It uses a determination of the range of dynamic data and is 
proportional to the range of the dynamic data.  If the load or the speed increase then 
the range of dynamic data would be expected to increase also.  Accordingly, the TI 
contains a factor that normalises the dynamic range so that the values for TI remain 
within a reasonably constant range irrespective of speed or load. 
The TI has a range between which the dynamic data from the APTs of a HV may be 
considered to be within operating boundaries.  Figure 14 shows an example of a TI 
plot vs. GVM indicating the upper and lower bounds for normal operation and 
dynamic signal results from HVs in this series of tests.  The tampering event in this 
Figure is shown to be outside the normal operational range. 
Logistical considerations during testing sometimes necessitated that tampering events 
were conducted only at full load.  In these instances, the healthy TI and tamper 
event(s) are not shown, as in Figure 14, as an area and point(s) respectively.  Instead, 
where tampering occurred at the full load point only, the healthy TI is shown as a 
linear range between two points with the tamper event depicted as a singularity at the 
full load point; Figure 15. 
On the subject of changes to dynamic data and range with speed, Figure 16 shows the 
result of the TI algorithm applied to data recorded at different speeds during previous 
testing (Davis, 2006a).  It is for noting that the range for those tests varies from that 
shown in Figure 14, Figure 15 and Figure 17 to Figure 54 due to increasing speed.  
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Nonetheless, the TI range for the higher-speed runs stays within the same order-of-
magnitude as that measured during the low-speed runs in this test programme.  
 
Figure 14.  Example of tampering indicator plot against load points.  Note the green shaded region 
represents the normal working range and upper and lower bounds of dynamic data of HVs in this series 
of tests. 
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Figure 15.  Example of tampering indicator plot against load points for full load cases.  Note the green 
arrow represents the normal working range and upper and lower bounds of dynamic data. 
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Figure 16.  Example of tampering indicator plot vs. speed. 
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5.4.2. Tampering indicator results 
 
Figure 17 to Figure 54 show the tampering indicator plots for the vehicles tested in 
this programme.  Note that in the following plots and as for section 5.3.1, the load 
points provided relate to the tested GVM of the HV. 
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5.4.3. Truck and dog trailer #1 
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Figure 17.  Tampering indicator plot against load points for the LHS truck drive axle. 
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Figure 18.  Tampering indicator plot against load points for the RHS truck drive axle. 
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Tampering indicator (TI) vs. load point - LMA RHS dog trailer 
dolly
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Figure 19.  Tampering indicator plot against load points for the RHS dog trailer dolly.  The LHS APTs for 
this group were not operational. 
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Figure 20.  Tampering indicator plot against load points for the dog trailer LHS rear axle group. 
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Figure 21.  Tampering indicator plot against load points for the dog trailer RHS rear axle group. 
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5.4.4. Semi-trailer #1 
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Figure 22.  Tampering indicator plot against load points for semi-trailer LHS drive axles. 
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Figure 23.  Tampering indicator plot against load points for semi-trailer RHS drive axles. 
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Figure 24.  Tampering indicator plot against load points for semi-trailer LHS trailer axles. 
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Figure 25.  Tampering indicator plot against load points for semi-trailer RHS trailer axles. 
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5.4.5. Semi-trailer #2 
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Figure 26.  Tampering indicator plot against load points for semi-trailer LHS drive axles. 
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Figure 27.  Tampering indicator plot against load points for semi-trailer RHS drive axles. 
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Figure 28.  Tampering indicator plot against load points for semi-trailer LHS trailer axles. 
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Figure 29.  Tampering indicator plot against load points for semi-trailer RHS trailer axles. 
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5.4.6. B-Double #1 
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Figure 30.  Tampering indicator plot against load points for B-Double LHS drive axles. 
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Figure 31.  Tampering indicator plot against load points for B-Double RHS drive axles. 
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Tampering indicator (TI) vs. load point - PSA LHS B-Double A 
trailer
0
1
2
3
4
23
00
0
41
40
0
55
50
0
67
50
0load point (kg)
TI
 
(ra
tio
)
Max TI dynamic - LHS Min TI dynamic - LHS
Max TI stationary - LHS Min TI stationary - LHS
tamper event, stationary data - LHS
 
Figure 32.  Tampering indicator plot against load points for B-Double LHS A trailer axles. 
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Figure 33.  Tampering indicator plot against load points for B-Double RHS A trailer axles. 
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Tampering indicator (TI) vs. load point - PSA RHS B-Double B 
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Figure 34.  Tampering indicator plot against load points for B-Double RHS B trailer axles.  The LHS 
APTs were not working for this series of tests. 
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5.4.7. Truck and dog trailer #2 
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Figure 35.  Tampering indicator plot against load points for rigid truck LHS drive axles.  
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Figure 36.  Tampering indicator plot against load points for rigid truck RHS drive axles. 
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Tampering indicator (TI) vs. load point - TRA LHS dog trailer 
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Figure 37.  Tampering indicator plot against load points for dog trailer dolly LHS axles.  
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Figure 38.  Tampering indicator plot against load points for dog trailer dolly RHS axles.  
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Tampering indicator (TI) vs. load point - TRA LHS dog trailer 
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Figure 39.  Tampering indicator plot against load points for dog trailer rear LHS axles.  
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Figure 40.  Tampering indicator plot against load points dog trailer rear RHS axles.  
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5.4.8. Type 1 road train 
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Figure 41.  Tampering indicator plot against load points for road train LHS drive group axles.  
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Figure 42.  Tampering indicator plot against load points for road train RHS drive group axles.  
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Tampering indicator (TI) vs. load point - ACA LHS semi-trailer 
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Figure 43.  Tampering indicator plot against load points for road train semi-trailer LHS axles.  
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Figure 44.  Tampering indicator plot against load points for road train semi-trailer RHS axles.  
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Tampering indicator (TI) vs. load point -  ACA LHS dog 
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Figure 45.  Tampering indicator plot against load points for road train dog trailer dolly LHS axles.  
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Figure 46.  Tampering indicator plot against load points for road train dog trailer dolly RHS axles.  
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Tampering indicator (TI) vs. load point -  ACA LHS dog 
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Figure 47.  Tampering indicator plot against load points for road train dog trailer rear LHS axles.  
 
Tampering indicator (TI) vs. load point -  ACA RHS dog 
trailer rear
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
30
20
0
51
10
0
67
50
0
83
00
0load point (kg)
TI
 
(ra
tio
)
Max TI dynamic - RHS Min TI dynamic - RHS
Max TI stationary - RHS Min TI stationary - RHS
tamper event 1, stationary data - RHS tamper event 2, stationary data - RHS
 
Figure 48.  Tampering indicator plot against load points for road train dog trailer rear RHS axles.  
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5.4.9. Semi-trailer #3 (pilot testing) 
Note that (Table 2), the APTs for the 1/3 and 2/3 load points failed during this 
testing.  Accordingly, all the values for TI and for the tamper points went to zero.  
This will be covered more comprehensively in the Discussion section; but suffice to 
say here that this event simulated tampering in any case.  Accordingly, data such as 
is depicted in Figure 49 would indicate a high probability of a tamper event, 
informing the next stage of this project, the specification of tamper detection. 
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Figure 49.  Tampering indicator plot against load points for semi-trailer LHS drive group axles.  
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Figure 50.  Tampering indicator plot against load points for semi-trailer RHS drive group axles.  
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Figure 51.  Tampering indicator plot against load points for semi-trailer LHS trailer group axles.  
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Figure 52.  Tampering indicator plot against load points for semi-trailer RHS trailer group axles.  
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5.4.10. Rigid truck 
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Figure 53.  Tampering indicator plot against load points for rigid truck LHS drive group axles.  
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Figure 54.  Tampering indicator plot against load points for rigid truck RHS drive group axles.  
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6. Discussion 
6.1. General 
Figure 17 to Figure 54 show the TIs for the corresponding tampering events where the 
air supply to the APTs were shut off.  Figure 47, Figure 48 and Figure 52 show 
examples where the TI associated with tamper events are not well differentiated from 
the healthy range of the TI value for untampered normal operation. 
6.2. Future directions for tampering indication 
One tamper-evident indicator will not be sufficient to prove, or even indicate 
tampering.  One of the key technical requirements leading to the success of the 
robustness of Stage 1 of the IAP programme has been to specify multiple quality 
indicators for the data from the GPS data.  This includes more than one way to 
indicate tampering with GPS units.  Similarly, and leveraging off the IAP capability, 
the following logical chain is proposed for a robust indication of tamper-event 
probability using quality indicators to hand as a result of these tests.  Given any 
normal operational scenario for a monitored HV, a number of metrics would be 
expected to be present, including: 
1. movement of the vehicle  (detected via GPS tracking capability) 
2. the frequency spectrum of the dynamic data not flat or peaking below (say) 
0.2 Hz 
3. the frequency spectrum of any dynamic data includes a peak magnitude 
above (say) 0.2 Hz 
4. multiple peaks are present in the frequency spectrum of the dynamic data 
5. there is a peak in the frequency spectrum between 1.0 and 2.0 Hz, when 
compared with the other frequencies in that range 
6. tamper indicator (TI) is within healthy bounds. 
If scenarios 1 to 6 are present, then tampering is highly improbable. 
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Further, as has been proposed and reported, an accelerometer mounted in the OBM 
module on the chassis could be used to determine if the HV is on level ground.  Some 
OBM systems use this feature to provide compensation for sloping vehicle stances 
(Davis, 2008).  This allows the operator to judge the veracity of the OBM system 
readout accuracy or, in more advanced applications, correct the raw transducer data 
before displaying a mass value (Davis, 2008). 
Adding to the above, then, a further proposal may be added to the list of quality 
indicators for OBM data reliability: 
7. dynamic signals from the chassis of the vehicle as it is in motion and as 
measured by an accelerometer in the OBM unit. 
Should a combination of metric 1, above, be present without metrics 2 to 7, it is highly 
likely that tampering has occurred. 
Other combinations, where present, potentially indicate tampering scenarios such as 
where metrics 2, 3, 4, 5 or 6 are not present individually but 7 is.  This combination of 
metrics would indicate, again, a high probability of a tamper event. 
Even for basic implementation of tamper-evidence without the multiple verifications 
of steps 1 to 7 above, the simple metrics of: 
 movement of the vehicle, as detected by GPS; 
 dynamic data being present at the chassis; and 
 absence of primary transducer signal (due to blocked air line or cables cut); 
would be a basic set of conditions that would indicate a tamper event. 
Figure 49 shows what happened when the signals from the APTs were removed from 
the recording inputs or not present.  Such events are obvious when shown in the 
graphical format.  They would fit into at least the negation of scenarios 2 and 5, above, 
and when combined with frequency-spectrum analysis (e.g. as indicated for the last 
semi-trailer in Table 2).  This combination would be a strong indicator (high 
probability) of a tampering event. 
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6.2.1. Tamper detection with load cells vs. APTs 
The issue of tampering with load cells has yet to be determined.  This is due to the 
inability of the test programme to connect load cells as primary mass transducers to 
both the reference system and the OBM system under test simultaneously.  When the 
test programme was conceived, it was done with the concept in mind that all primary 
transducer signals (e.g. APTs) or their characteristic base quantity (e.g. pressure) 
would be monitored by both the reference system and the OBM system under test.  In 
the case of load cells, this was not possible due to in inability of load cells to be 
connected to two measurement devices at once.  This limitation, which is a limitation 
imposed by the physics of the bridges in load cells in general, meant that no dynamic 
signals were measured off load cells during these tests.   
Dynamic data from other testing has recorded load cell dynamic data (Davis & Sack, 
2005).  An example of the dynamic signature of a load cell during travel is provided 
below in Figure 55. 
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Figure 55.  Example of frequency plot from 5th wheel load cell. 
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Anecdotal data has it that wedges may be inserted under load cells with the result that 
the reading from the load cell indicates less than the actual applied load.  This test 
programme has shown that view to be the case. 
A small test programme by the TCA team will use a modified reference system to 
measure the dynamic signals from load cells before and after tampering using the 
wedging technique.  It is hoped that the TI measure, when applied to this data, will 
show that tampering has occurred in these instances.  The nature of the data in Figure 
55 indicates that this approach has a good chance of success. 
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7. Conclusion 
From the results of the frequency-domain analysis performed on the data from the on-
board mass (OBM) system testing, it appears feasible that tamper-evident metrics can 
be derived from logical rules and some simple algorithms, most of which are in the 
public domain.  For a robust and tamper-evident OBM solution to be accepted by 
stakeholders, it is likely, given previous experience with Stage 1 of the Intelligent 
Access Programme, that more than one quality indicator from dynamic data will be 
required to show tamper evidence.  Frequency of dynamic signals from the OBM 
units, the tamper indicator (TI) metric and business rules regarding movement of the 
vehicle compared with dynamic data will all need to be considered as Transport 
Certification Australia moves into the specification phase for the OBM feasibility 
project. 
More work is needed to refine the TI measure since there were some instances where 
tamper event resulted in TI values were close to the TI for healthy operation. 
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Appendix 1.  Definitions, Abbreviations & Glossary 
 
Terms, 
abbreviations 
and acronyms 
Meaning 
Accuracy Accuracy is the relationship between a measured value and a reference.  
Increasing system accuracy comes from the measured value 
approaching the reference.  See Figure 1. 
APT Air pressure transducer.  A device for emitting an electrical signal as a 
proportional surrogate of input air pressure. 
ARRB Australian Road Research Board – now privatised, has changed its 
name to ARRB Group Limited. 
ARTSA Australian Road Transport Suppliers Association. 
ATC Australian Transport Council.  “The Australian Transport Council (ATC) is a 
Ministerial forum for Commonwealth, State and Territory consultations and 
provides advice to governments on the coordination and integration of all 
transport and road policy issues at a national level.”  
http://www.atcouncil.gov.au 
ATRF Australasian Transport Research Forum.  A conference for presentation of 
papers and colloquia on matters of transport planning, policy and research. 
 
OBM accuracy and ancillary device testing: dynamic data analysis and tamper evidence 
 
75 
 
 
BIFA Bilateral Infrastructure Funding Agreement.  Also known as the Auslink 
agreement.  An agreement between individual States of Australia and the 
Commonwealth which “covers arrangements applying to funding made 
available by the Australian Government to Queensland under the first five-
year AusLink investment programme (2004-05 to 2008-09) and any agreed 
subsequent changes to, and extensions of, the programme.  It also covers 
agreed arrangements for infrastructure planning, identification of investment 
priorities, development and assessment of project proposals and evaluation of 
completed projects.”  (Australia Department of Transport and Regional 
Services, 2005b). 
Body bounce Movement of the sprung mass of a truck as measured between the axles and 
the chassis.  Results in truck body dynamic forces being transmitted to the 
road via the axles & wheels. 
Usually manifests in the frequency range 1 –  4Hz. 
CoG Centre of gravity.  The point at which a body’s mass may be said be 
concentrated for purposes of determining forces on that body. 
Damping ratio  
 
How much the shock absorbers reduce suspension bounce after the truck hits a 
bump.  The damping ratio, zeta )(ζ  is given as a value under 1 (e.g. 0.3) or a 
percentage (e.g. 30%).   
∆ Greek letter “delta” – denoting increment. 
DIVINE Dynamic Interaction between heavy Vehicles and INfrastructurE. 
DoTaRS Department of Transport and Regional Services.  An Australian Government 
department. 
EBS Electronic braking systems 
ECM Engine control module 
Eigenfrequency Frequency of a body at one of its vibrational resonance modes. 
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FFT Fast Fourier transform.  A method whereby the Fourier transform is found 
using discretisation and conversion into a frequency spectrum. 
Fourier transform A method whereby the relative magnitudes of the frequency components of a 
time-series signal are converted to, and displayed as, a frequency series.  If the 
integrable function is h(t), then the Fourier transform is: 
dteth
tiω
ωφ
−+∞
∞
∫=
-
)(  )(
 
Where: 
φ  is the Fourier series; 
ω is the frequency in radians/s; and 
1−=i  
(Jacob & Dolcemascolo, 1998). 
GVM Gross vehicle mass. 
HML Higher mass limits.  Under the HML schemes in Australia, heavy vehicles are 
allowed to carry more mass (payload) in return for their suspension 
configuration being “road friendly”.  See VSB 11. 
HV Heavy vehicle. 
Hz Hertz.  Unit of vibration denoting cycles per second. 
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IAP Intelligent Access Programme.  The Intelligent Access Program (IAP) is 
defined by the TCA as third generation HV access to the Australian 
network.  This approach is intended to complement ‘general’ and 
‘restricted’ access with a further layer of ‘intelligent’ access.  The IAP 
voluntary programme provides HVs with improved access to the 
Australian network.  This with the proviso that HVs thus benefited are 
monitored using GPS tracking or other forms of vehicle telematics to 
ensure compliance with improved access conditions.  (Transport 
Certification Australia, 2005). 
MCV Multi-combination vehicle.  HVs with general arrangement or GVM greater 
than that of a semi-trailer. 
MM Measured mass.  The reading from the OBM system. 
NHVAS National Heavy Vehicle Accreditation Scheme.  A voluntary scheme that 
certifies transport operators against a set of industry-specific quality assurance 
requirements.  Membership of this scheme is a pre-requisite for HML. 
NRTC National Road Transport Commission.  A national body set up by the States of 
Australia to facilitate economic reform of the road transport industry.  Became 
the NTC earlier this decade. 
NSW New South Wales. 
NTC See NRTC 
MRWA Main Roads Western Australia. 
OBM On-board mass.  A generic term describing the systems used to monitor a HV 
for its mass using on-board telematics.  EBS and ECM systems are included 
within this generic definition. 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
Participants On-board mass suppliers, their representatives in Australia or the non-
TCA parties to the confidentiality agreement in Appendix 6. 
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PBS Performance-based standards 
http://www.ntc.gov.au/viewpage.aspx?page=A023114004005800200 
Precision Repeatability in measurement data.  Precision is an assessment of the 
variation in measurement of the same value.  The more precise 
measurements are, the closer together their measured values.  See Figure 
1. 
QDMR Queensland Department of Main Roads 
QT Queensland Transport 
QUT Queensland University of Technology 
RFS “Road-friendly” suspension.  A HV suspension conforming to certain limits of 
performance parameters defined by VSB 11.  (Australia Department of 
Transport and Regional Services, 2004) 
RM Reference mass.  The mass reading from the certified scales.  See measured 
mass (MM). 
RTA Roads and Traffic Authority, NSW 
SPV Special purpose vehicle (e.g. cranes or low-loaders) 
TCA Transport Certification Australia Limited.  Established in 2005 as a public 
company.  TCA members are the road authorities of the Australian, 
State, and Territory governments.  TCA supports the development and 
implementation of the IAP and administers the IAP including 
legislative, policy and administrative issues.  (Transport Certification 
Australia Ltd, 2007). 
TI Tampering indicator.  A value proportion to the dynamic range of a signal 
from an on-board mass system.  Used to determine the likelihood of a 
tampering event. 
TSA Transport South Australia 
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VSB 11 Vehicle Standards Bulletin 11.  A document issued by DoTaRS that defines 
the performance parameters of “road-friendly” HV suspensions. 
WiM Weigh-in-motion.  Technology that uses sensors in the road to measure the 
wheel-force of vehicles. 
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Appendix 2.  Suspension details of test HVs 
Prime mover Unit 1 Unit 2 Unit 3 
Test Configuration 
Make and Model 
Drive axle 
suspension 
Make and Model Suspension Make and Model Suspension Make and Model Suspension 
Brisbane pilot 
testing 
B-double 
(Grain) 
Kenworth T404 
SAR 
Kenworth Airglide 
8-bag 
Hamelex White BPW Hamelex White BPW - - 
Melbourne 
pilot testing 
Semi-trailer 
(Flat top) Volvo FM12 420 Volvo Air Barker BPW - - - - 
Test 1 - 
Melbourne 
Rigid truck 
(Garbage) Isuzu FVR900T 
Hendrickson HAS 
230 
- - - - - - 
Truck and dog 
(Quarry) Mack Fleetliner Neway Air Preston trailers BPW Preston trailers BPW Preston trailers BPW Test 2 - 
Sydney Semi-trailer 
(Quarry) Iveco Powerstar 
Hendrickson PAX 
460 
Hamelex White BPW - - - - 
Test 3 - 
Tasmania 
B-double 
(Logging) Kenworth 
Kenworth Airglide 
8-bag 
Kennedy York Kennedy York - - 
  
Semi-trailer 
(Logging) Kenworth 
Kenworth Airglide 
8-bag 
Kennedy York - - - - 
Test 4 - 
Brisbane 
Truck and dog Iveco Powerstar 
Hendrickson PAX 
460 
Shepard York Shepard York Shepard York 
Test 5 - Perth 
Double road 
train (flat top) Iveco Eurotech 
Hendrickson HAS 
400 
O'Phee BPW O'Phee BPW O'Phee BPW 
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